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When the History of Property Rights Encounters the 
Economics of Convention. Some Open Questions  
Starting from European History 
Michela Barbot ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Geschichte der Eigentumsrechte trifft auf die Economics of 
Convention. Einige offene Fragen aus Sicht der europäischen Geschichte«. The 
aim of this article is to analyse the relationships between law and conventions 
with regards to an issue still little explored in the perspective of the Economics 
of Convention (EC): the history of property rights. Focusing on Continental Eu-
rope, the main key points of the recent debate on property rights’ long-term 
evolution will be outlined, which are basically developed along the lines of the 
New Historical Institutionalism theories (NHI). After discussing the NHI ap-
proach to legal institutions, it will be demonstrated how even the soundest 
criticisms to this approach do not exhaust the list of open questions on the re-
lationship between conventions and property rights. These questions are mainly 
related to the problems of uncertainty and to the connection between property 
rules, their interpretation and their legitimization. By defining these questions, 
it will be shown how the EC perspective could contribute to providing a more 
complex interpretation – and therefore historically more pertinent – of the 
long-term changes of one of the major legal institutions of western capitalism. 
Keywords: Property rights, 19th-century codifications, economics of conven-
tion, new historical institutionalism, legal enforcement, uncertainty, legality, 
legitimacy. 
1.  Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between law and conven-
tions with regards to an issue still little explored in the perspective of the Eco-
nomics of Convention (EC): the history of property rights.1 In particular, I will 
mainly focus on my principal field of research, related to the European coun-
tries belonging to the Roman and Civil Law tradition. The choice of this geo-
graphical area will also enable me to avoid the disproportionately Anglo-
                                                             
∗  Michela Barbot, IDHES ENS-Cachan, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan Cedex, 
France; michela.barbot@ens-cachan.fr. 
1   Regarding modern economies, Christian Bessy’s (2006) analyses on intellectual property 
constitute an important exception. 
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centric viewpoint which still dominates literature on this subject (Béaur et al. 
2013). Property rights, in fact, are a classic theme of Western European eco-
nomic historiography.2 Starting with the analysis of Enclosures in England, the 
first investigations into the industrial revolution contributed to the formulation of 
a thesis which sharply distinguishes between property “rights” and property 
“wrongs” (Scott 2003), where the “good” property right has been pre-eminently 
identified as the right to complete, absolute and exclusive individual ownership 
formalised in Continental Europe during the 19th century. 
Since the 1970s, following the New Historical Institutionalism (NHI) anal-
yses inspired by Douglass North’s works, interest in this field has gradually 
shifted from the issue of the efficiency of property rights to the efficiency of 
the way in which they are enforced, opening the way to a deeper analysis of the 
relationship between legal rules and the actors who interact with them.3 Mov-
ing on from an efficiency-oriented interpretation, and essentially remaining 
anchored to the assumption of the Rational Choice Theory (Diaz-Bone and 
Salais 2011; Diaz-Bone 2012), the empirical researches based on the frame-
work of the NHI have drawn a certain amount of criticism among legal and 
economic historians (Congost 2003; Harris 2003; Ogilvie 2007; Congost and 
Santos 2010). In this article, I will firstly summarise what is known about the 
history of property in Western Continental Europe from the Middle Ages to the 
19th century transformations (section 2). Then, in section 3, I will outline the 
main key points of the recent debate on this subject, basically developed along 
the lines of the NHI theories. On the one hand, I will discuss the approach of 
the NHI to legal institutions, and on the other I will demonstrate how even the 
soundest criticisms to this approach do not exhaust the list of open questions on 
the historical evolution of the relationship between conventions and property 
rights. These questions are mainly related to the problems of uncertainty and 
conflicts about ownership, to the role of objects in defining the rights to appro-
priation, and to the connection between property rules, their interpretation and 
their legitimization. Section 4 will illustrate how these open questions could be 
explored with the help of the EC. By defining these research questions, I will 
show how the EC perspective could contribute to providing a more complex 
interpretation – and therefore historically more pertinent – of the long-term 
                                                             
2  Suffice it to mention the work carried out by Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber and the 
classic institutionalists, as well as Marc Bloch’s famous thesis on agrarian individualism 
(Bloch 1930). For an overview of the interpretations on property rights and economic devel-
opment, see Getzler (1996). 
3  However, this does not mean that the theory of the existence of property rights and property 
wrongs has been totally discarded. On the one hand, it is still found today in a great deal of 
historical research (see section 3); on the other, economists studying the connection between 
property rights and efficiency have for a long time recommended private property as best for 
economic growth (De Soto 2000), claiming that its non-definition erodes market activity, and 
this claim has become the centrepiece of IMF and World Bank policymaking (Stiglitz 2002). 
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changes of one of the major institutions of western capitalism. In conclusion, I 
will also briefly discuss the importance of a historical-conventionalist analysis 
of the most important producer of rules and legal incentives: the State. 
2.  Property Rights before the 19th-Century Codifica-
tions: An Overview 
Any long-term analysis of the evolution of property rights in Continental Eu-
rope cannot but start from a crucial fact: this evolution is characterised by a 
definite formal discontinuity, caused by the 19th-century codifications, and 
especially by the French Civil Code of 1804. This Code was promulgated 
throughout the Napoleonic Empire and served as a model for the legal codes of 
more than 20 nations throughout the world. It was the first modern legal code 
to be adopted throughout Europe (Halperin 2003). Article 544 established 
private, absolute and exclusive property as the main form of property legally 
possible, at the expense of the other two major regimes that had prevailed since 
medieval times: collective property (the Commons) and dissociated property 
(the Dominia, from the Latin dominium: Grossi 1992). Unlike the Commons, in 
which ownership was – and still is – shared by the members of a group or a 
community, the medieval and early modern Dominia clearly separated property 
rights into two distinct levels, an eminent right (dominium eminentis) and a 
usage right (dominium utilis), that could be divided and attributed to several 
individuals or institutions.4 In spite of this difference, both the Commons and 
the Dominia accorded an undisputed primacy to the actual possession over 
formal deeds (Grossi 1981; Conte et al. 1999). This meant that, in the case of 
disputes, the real use of an object could legally prevail over the presentation of 
written agreements and formal entitlements (Cerutti 2003; Barbot 2011).  
Disregarding these two legal systems, the Code Napoléon formalised a 
strong anthropological change in the relationship between the objects and the 
subjects of property. While article 544 of the Civil Code recognises property as 
a sacred, inviolable and exclusive subjective right, on the contrary, the pervious 
legal concepts of property, on the contrary, were entirely centred on the “nature 
of things” (Hart 1961; Grossi 1992) and regarded property rights as objective 
and infinitely divisible entities. Following the Commons and the Dominia 
systems, in fact, a single asset could have various owners, and any of the own-
ers could own even infinitesimal parts of the rights of usus, abusus or fructus 
                                                             
4  One for the most common contractual forms of this property dissociation was the em-
phyteusis, whose origins go back to Roman law. The emphyteusis contract created a physical 
separation between the dominium eminentis of a piece of land and the dominium utilis of 
the buildings constructed on it (Faron and Hubert 1995). 
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existing on it.5 Especially in the case of the Dominia, these portions could, in 
turn, be entirely or partially sold, subleased or conveyed from one generation to 
another.6 Then, the same asset could be involved in a large number of transac-
tions, which required the coordination of all the actors who held a right to it.  
This does not mean, however, that prior to the 19th century, exclusive and 
individual ownership – that is the simultaneous possession by the same subject 
of the three rights of usus, abusus and fructus – did not exist. On the one hand, 
it was simply one option from among a number of institutional alternatives 
available.7 On the other hand, the exercise of this right was often restricted by 
some legal devices, such as primogeniture or entail (fideicommissum), which 
subordinated the interests of individuals to those of preserving their kinship.8  
All of these characteristics had important consequences on the overall struc-
ture of the Ancien Régime societies. One of the most significant effects at the 
economic level was that wealth was identified more by the actual use and pos-
session than by the formal ownership of an asset (Todeschini 2004; Alfani and 
Barbot 2009). Taking this concept of wealth into account, many systems of 
direct taxation consequently affected the users more than the formal proprietors 
of land and houses (Ruggiu 2009; Barbot et al. 2014). Moreover, the relevance 
of the “nature of things” meant that one of the most common conventions used 
to determine the economic value of goods was their intrinsic value. This quan-
tity was determined by experts, usually organised in guilds and professional 
bodies, whose task was to identify and explicit the objective qualities relevant 
to the evaluation.9 As a result of the combination of a large number of criteria 
(among which, for example, the assessment of the quality of the raw materials 
and of their state of preservation), the intrinsic value was never defined unilat-
erally, but always established and calculated by experts in the context of “the 
                                                             
5 The three legal categories of usus (i.e. the right to use a thing), fructus (the right to the 
proceeds of a thing) and abusus (the right to dispose of a thing) were at the basis of the 
Roman conception of property: Halperin (2008). 
6 Many examples of these numerous divisions, especially in Italy, are to be found in Chauvard 
(2003) and Barbot (2008). 
7 It is important to point out that in contractual practice, private property could be linked to 
Commons and Dominia within the same transaction. These phenomena, in turn, make it diffi-
cult to empirically distinguish between private and non-private forms of property (Béaur et al. 
2013). 
8 The entail and the primogeniture were two inheritance practices used to exclude certain heirs 
and preserve the family estate. The combination of these legal devices generated a property 
restriction by limiting the inheritance to the owner’s first descendant (Bellavitis et al. 2012). 
9 Bert De Munck (2011) has shown that, at the end of the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, both the convention of intrinsic value and the power of the guilds to define product 
quality became obsolete because of epistemological transformations. In this regard, it is 
possible to explore also the hypothesis that these changes were in some way linked to the 
gradual establishment of the contractual practices of exclusive private property, which oc-
curred in various parts of Europe and began to emerge precisely in the eighteenth century 
(Barbot 2008; Béaur et al. 2013). 
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circumstances” (Barbot 2012). In their evaluation, these experts make use of 
two technical devices very familiar to the EC: measurement and qualification 
(Grenier 2003; Barbot et al. 2010).  
Within the societies of the Ancien Régime, the social “value” of people was 
also determined on the basis of numerous criteria of classification.10 Among 
them, property rights played a dual role. On the one hand, the numerous kinds 
of collective or divided ownership contributed to creating social hierarchies 
which only partially overlapped the stratifications made by age, income, gender 
or profession (Brewer and Staves 1996). On the other hand, the entitlements on 
land and real estate produced several forms of social inclusion by interacting 
with the citizenship through the juridical mechanisms of residence.11  
3.  From the “Property Rights-Property Wrongs” Dicho-
tomy to the Problem of Enforcement  
Opening the way for the triumph of a legal culture centred on people rather 
than things, and on the exclusivity rather than the divisibility of property rights, 
the 19th-century codifications led to a formal change which was achieved in 
different ways, depending on the local context. However, despite the great 
variety of historical experiences, the evolution of property rights in Europe has 
been analysed at length in terms of the fundamental primacy of the absolute 
property rights of individuals, thought to be the most appropriate legal form to 
facilitate the birth of capitalism, compared to all the other “property wrongs” 
existing in the course of history. 
During the 1960s, a similar dichotomy also emerged in economics, in the con-
text of the debate generated by the theory on the so-called “tragedy of the Com-
mons”. According to this theory, elaborated by Garrett Hardin in a famous article 
in Science (1968), in a society with a population growth, the depletion of a shared 
resource by individuals, acting rationally on the basis of the their self-interest, acts 
contrary to the group’s long-term interests by depleting the common resource. In 
this sense, collective rights on natural resources already contain the seeds for their 
“tragedy”, which could have been avoided by granting individual rights.  
Douglass North’s initial research, developed shortly after the formulation of 
Hardin’s theory, was also based on the “property rights-property wrongs” thesis, 
but then his position became less specific and more complex. As I have already 
                                                             
10  On professional classifications, see Judde de Larivière and Hanne (2011). 
11  In the case of Italian cities during the Ancien Régime, I have been able to demonstrate that the 
different forms of the management of urban and real estate (short-term leases, emphyteusis, 
exclusive property, etc.) were in turn connected to different “degrees of citizenship” (Barbot 
2013). For an analysis of the connections between citizenship and property, see also Cerutti 
(2012). 
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re-called, the NHI theory on legal institutions has undergone various changes 
over the last forty years.12 More precisely, at least three different stages can be 
identified. 
(1) In a first stage, during the 1970s, legal rules – and in particular property 
rules – are essentially viewed as a precondition for the development of the 
markets. The question at this stage is how a given regime of ownership affects 
resource allocation and economic performance, and precisely how the most effi-
cient regime is envisaged in the exclusive property of individuals. The most 
emblematic work at this stage is undoubtedly Douglass North and Robert Thom-
as’ book from 1973, entitled The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic 
History. In this work, the authors attempt to identify the elements that allowed 
the Western European economy to rise to affluence in the early modern era. The 
key to growth is an efficient legal system: efficient in the sense that the system of 
property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce and, con-
versely, inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or 
excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. In their own words,  
ideally by providing proper incentives, a fully efficient economic organisation 
would ensure that the private and social rates of return were the same for each 
activity and that both were equal among all economic activities. In such a sit-
uation each individual would desire to maximize his wealth and would have 
the exclusive right to use his land, labour, capital and other possessions as he 
sees fit; also that he alone has the right to transfer his resources to another, and 
that property rights are so defined that no one else is either benefited or 
harmed by his use of his property (North and Thomas 1973, 91).  
North and Thomas then claim to trace the reasons for the divergent paths of 
growth in Europe in the success or failure to impose an efficient legal system of 
well-defined individual property rights. At the time, the prime examples of 
success in these fields were the 16th and 17th centuries’ Dutch and English 
economies in comparison with the coeval stagnation of France and the decline 
of Spain. In his next book (1981), North even more explicitly supports the 
thesis of the existence of good and bad property rights, applying the theory of 
the tragedy of the Commons to the entire prehistory of the world:  
Prehistoric man employed labor in conjunction with natural resources to produce 
his living. Natural resources were initially held as common property. This type 
of property implies free access by all to the resource. Economists are familiar 
                                                             
12  These changes, in turn, are linked to the degree in which Douglass North increasingly dis-
tanced himself from the assumptions of neo-classical economics. The emphasis on the artic-
ulation between cognitive processes and institutions (Knight and North 1997), in fact, 
caused him to move further away from the neo-classical research programme. Although of 
considerable importance, I will not discuss this issue here, as, empirically, North’s changes of 
viewpoint have not significantly influenced the historical research based on his framework. 
For an analysis of the relationship between NHI and the neo-classical economy, see for in-
stance Bessy (2002).  
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with the proposition that unconstrained access to a resource base will lead to its 
inefficient utilisation. This inefficiency, as the demand for the resource increas-
es, eventually leads to the depletion of the resource. This instance is an example 
of incentive failure caused by property rights inadequacies (North 1981, 80).  
(2) In a second phase (roughly from the beginning of the 1990s), two major 
developments are to be found in the neo-institutionalist framework. On the one 
hand, the works of Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2005), refuting the inevitability of the 
tragedy of the Commons, show that exclusive individual private property is not 
always the most economically efficient legal form.13 On the other hand, in-
creasingly influenced by the developments of the neo-classical theory of prop-
erty rights (Demsetz 1967), the focus of NHI’s authors’ moved from the identi-
fication of good and bad property rights to the problem of the efficiency of 
their enforcement. Following so called Coase-theorem (Coase 1960), the cen-
tral explanatory variable is now unequivocally identified in the transaction 
costs, i.e. “the costs of protecting property rights and policing, specifying and 
enforcing agreements” (North 1990, 220). The problem of enforcement, in turn, 
increasingly encourages NHI framework to focus not only on the rules, but also 
on the actors who interact with them. In this phase, Douglass North perfects his 
theory introducing the distinction between “institutions” (the formal or infor-
mal rules of the game) and “organisations” (the actors or players in the game). 
According to North, “it is the interaction between institutions and organisations 
that shapes the institutional evolution of an economy” (North 1994, 7). It is im-
portant to note that, for North, the rules that count within this interaction are the 
formal ones: laws, contracts, regulations, constitutions. On the contrary, the in-
formal institutions (i.e. conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes 
of conduct) are considered as immutable cultural features which do not react 
immediately to changes in formal rules, and whose rates of transformation are so 
slow as to be immaterial, producing ‘path dependency’ phenomena (North 1990). 
(3) In the third and final stage (from the 2000s), the main issue is to under-
stand exactly why people follow – or not follow – the rules of the game, and 
how to create effective controls and incentives able to steer institutional change 
along the path of economic growth. In this phase, NHI offers two major an-
swers to these questions. The first is clearly explained in Douglass North’s 
most recent works. The increasing attention he pays to legal and contractual 
enforcement and the recognised primacy of formal rules leads him to apply his 
analysis more and more to the major agent responsible for the definition and 
protection of the legal rules: the State. Already in 1981, North stated that “a 
theory of the State is essential because it is the State that is responsible for the 
efficiency of the property right structure, which causes growth or stagnation or 
economic decline” (North 1981, 17). In the latest book by Douglass North, 
                                                             
13  Various historians have similarly illustrated the conditions which could have made the 
commons in England economically viable: see for instance Allen (1992); Clark (1998). 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  85 
John J. Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (2009), the role of the State is increasing-
ly underscored, to the extent that it becomes the outright protagonist of a global 
story of the entire history of the world. Moving on from Max Weber’s defini-
tion of the State as holder of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force (Didry 
2006), the variable which makes it possible to understand economic develop-
ment in a historical perspective is envisaged in the minimization of violence by 
State organisations, and institutional change is thought to result from a shift in 
the interests or knowledge of the political actors that govern the States and 
shape the “rules of the game”.  
Alongside North’s essentially State-oriented explanations, other neo-
institutionalists have insisted rather on self-enforcing mechanisms set in motion 
by individuals in their interactions at a micro-level. In particular, Avner Greif 
(2006), making use of the game theory, has focused on North’s blind spot 
theory, that is on the analysis of enforcement produced by informal institutions, 
social norms and beliefs prevailing in situations characterised by a lack of State 
structures, as is the case in European pre-state societies. Starting from the same 
question posed by North on the understanding of factors at the roots of the rise 
of western economies, Greif dates the institutional foundations of European 
development back to the Middle Ages. The reason is that, at the time, “the 
structure of society in the West was centred on interest-based, self-governed, 
non kin-based urban organisations” – in particular the merchant guilds – which 
fostered an “individualistic culture”, crucial to the development of capitalism 
(Greif 2006, 26). With Greif there is a further evolution in NHI’s approach to 
legal institutions: the most relevant research object is no longer how the rules are 
legally and contractually enforced, but rather the individual motivations and self-
incentives to follow them. It is interesting to note that North’s State-oriented 
perspective is corrected and adjusted by Greif with a more radically individualis-
tic and rational choice-oriented approach, which identifies the maximization of 
individual interests as the basic reason for the respect of legal rules. 
4.   From the Economics of Convention to the Politics of 
Conventions: Towards a Conventionalist Analysis of 
Property Rights  
Empirically applied in a considerable amount of research,14 the NHI develop-
ments (even going beyond the intentions of their early promoters) have been in 
some way absorbed into the prevailing interpretation of the history of property 
rights in Europe, in which the mainstream property rights-property wrongs 
dichotomy has not really been completely abandoned. According to this inter-
                                                             
14  See for instance North et al. (1996). 
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pretation, the development of Western capitalism would have its roots in two 
main institutional processes, whose different rates of implementation, in turn, 
would explain the divergence in the growth of European countries (as well as 
the divergence between the West and the rest of the world):15 the spread of a 
culture based on individualism and self-interest, and the formation of national 
States oriented towards the defence and enforcement of individual’s property 
rights. In countries with slower economic growth, these processes would be 
hindered for a long time by a variety of factors, among which one of the most 
important is the persistence of the non-exclusivity, plurality and inadequate 
definition and certification of property rights. These elements seemingly had 
the effect of encouraging the multiplication of disputes over property, causing 
high transaction costs, reducing individual initiative and, in the end, hindering 
the creation of a system of taxation functional to reallocate efficiently the re-
sources available.  
In the last decade, this interpretation, although still dominant, has been chal-
lenged both in the field of economic and social history, and in that of legal histo-
ry. The analysis of these criticisms is extremely interesting because each of them 
raises – often without solving them – some knotty theoretical-methodological 
questions making it feasible to outline a possible conventionalist research agenda 
on the history of property rights.  
(1) The first critical point, which can easily be dealt with from the perspec-
tive of the EC, is the hypothesis that Ancien Régime economies were character-
ized by a high level of uncertainty which depended on the non-exclusivity and 
the pluralism of the Commons and the Dominia systems (Rosenthal 1992). In 
recent years, research carried out in the field of micro-history has refuted that 
this uncertainty had no remedy, revealing the crucial role played by the numer-
ous medieval and early modern local courts in the certification and ex post 
definition of property rights (Ago 2002). Some of these studies have also 
shown that, in general, uncertain property rights are not always so problematic 
and may even be advantageous for the actors, allowing them to operate more 
strategically in the interstices opened by the plurality and non-exclusivity of the 
legal norms. These discoveries, while certainly important, are, however, limited 
by the fact that they move from the same definition of uncertainty that is as-
sumed by the approaches from which they wish to distance themselves. Both in 
the view of the NHI, which considers it as a nuisance, and in the view of those 
who consider its advantages, uncertainty is reduced to its neo-classical defini-
tion, which, in brief, interprets it as a state of incompleteness composed of two 
distinct elements: the natural uncertainty connected to the physical environ-
                                                             
15  A framework quite similar to the one developed to analyse the European intradivergence 
has indeed been used also to explain the so-called “Great divergence” between the West 
and the East, and notoriously between Europe and China (Pomeranz 2000; Greif and Tabel-
lini 2010; Rosenthal and Wong 2011). 
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ment, and the critical uncertainty caused by the foreseeable difficulties of indi-
viduals. As many members of the EC have pointed out (Favereau 1988; Salais 
1998a; Thévenot 2002a), this idea of uncertainty has two main drawbacks. On 
the one hand, it tends to reduce the actors’ critical capacity merely to being 
able to implement rational strategies and carry out maximizing calculations, 
and, on the other, it considers the activities of identification, measurement and 
qualification of the assets purely as sources of transaction costs and factors 
which disturb economic life.  
The historicization of the category of uncertainty, which is essential in order 
to analyse its long-term effects, would instead mean having to carry out two 
operations particularly consistent with the EC approach. The first one is to 
abandon the object-subject cleavage underlying the neo-classical definition, in 
favour of an analysis that takes together – rather than separately – the critical 
uncertainty of actors and the natural uncertainty linked to the external world. 
This operation would be extremely useful to examine in depth the logics of two 
legal regimes intrinsically “objective” like the medieval and early modern 
Commons and Dominia, centered “on things, more than on human beings” 
(Grossi 1992, 22). In this perspective, the analysis carried out within the EC on 
the role of material objects in providing support to the dynamics of action and 
coordination (Conein et al. 1993; Thévenot 2002, 2006; Bessy 2002) would 
make it possible to overcome a limitation existing in many of the works based 
on the NHI approach: their inclination to analyse property rights regardless of 
the characteristics of things they are specifically concerned with. Whether they 
are material assets (such as land or artefacts) or more intangible assets like 
licenses or patents, the concrete features of the objects of property are only 
marginally taken into consideration by NHI to explain the institutional dynam-
ics. What is important for NHI explanation, in fact, is essentially the interaction 
between the rules and the players, in the form of enforcement or self-
enforcement of the most economically efficient institutions.  
A further problematic aspect connected to the way NHI deals with uncer-
tainty is the negative way that it regards conflicts, the intensity of which is 
essentially viewed as a dangerous source of transaction costs. Undoubtedly the 
Ancien Régime property system, made of a highly stratified bundle of rights, 
left the way open for countless causes for litigation among the many who were 
entitled to rights on each single asset. Not always, however, did these disputes 
– although they generated costs – harm coordination. On the contrary, they 
could contribute to opening new opportunities of action, leading to a redefinition, 
re-negotiation or even to a change in the rules of the game. The potential and 
possibilities created by such disputes have never, or hardly ever, been explored 
by scholars of property rights, who instead have emphasised the inefficiency 
linked to the numerous disputes which abound in the judicial archives of the 
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Ancien Régime.16 From the point of view of the EC, these archives, indeed, con-
stitute an extraordinary opportunity to accede to the actors’ interpretations of law, 
as it is precisely in case of disputes that the articulation between the legality and 
legitimacy of legal rules is more apparent (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
(2) We now come to the second important critical point in the interpretation 
of legal institutions provided by NHI. This critical element has been well-
described by Ron Harris in an article devoted to the relationships between legal 
history and the neo-institutionalist framework (2003). According to Harris,  
NHI historians often abstract the legal system into three elements: property 
rights, contracts and state enforcement [...]. The meaning of these rules is tak-
en to be predetermined and does not require an ex post interpretation or exer-
cise of discretion before implementation in concrete disputes. The institutional 
structure of the judiciary in these cases is taken to be simple and irrelevant and 
usually no conflict is observed between spheres of jurisdiction or bodies of 
law. The legal profession is non-existent or facilitative. Abstractions such as 
these are problematic when applied to systems with a long and complex histo-
ry such as England, the European continent, or the Atlantic states of the US. In 
these areas, the arrangements that deal with what economists consider to be 
property rights or contracts are fragmented and scattered among various com-
partments of the system of juridical norms. Each piece, or legal rule, interre-
lates with the other, at times, seemingly unrelated pieces in a thick legal-
historical context (Harris 2003, 339-40).  
In this passage, Harris highlights two important limitations in NHI’s approach 
to legal rules. On the one hand, this approach tends to stylise the reconstruction 
of the legal historical context of which these rules are part, keeping only its 
very basic elements (which in this way become sort of ahistorical ‘black box-
es’). On the other, it omits the question of the interpretation of rules at two 
distinct levels. Firstly, at the level of the actors subject to the rule, because it 
limits their field of action to the alternative between compliance (by means of 
external enforcement or internalization through social norms and beliefs) or 
deviance from them. And, secondly, at the level of the entire legal system, 
because it crystallises and reifies the rules, obscuring the ongoing process of 
modification and adaptation carried out by jurisprudence (Didry 2002) and by 
legal experts (Bessy 2007, 2012) within the situations in which these rules are 
actually implemented or mobilized. 
To overcome these two limitations, the analysis of the ways the legal norms 
are appropriated and reshaped in contractual, judicial and jurisprudential prac-
tices is undoubtedly an essential operation. This operation, however – especial-
                                                             
16  The same connection between conflicts and inefficiency, indeed, should be more precisely 
and extensively tested. In the case of the history of rights on irrigation canals in Northern 
Italy, I have, for example, been able to show that the rise of an agrarian capitalism in this 
area took place at a time when the number of disputes was increasing rather than diminish-
ing (Barbot 2014).  
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ly in the case of property rights – must also take into consideration the role of 
normative authorities who, with their action, largely contribute to giving form 
and substance to juridical rules. We have seen that NHI, in general, considers 
the role of the State in relatively minimal terms: the predominant driving force 
of government elites is recognised in the minimization of violence and con-
flicts, and the main task of these elites is envisaged in the definition and protec-
tion of the most efficient property rights. NHI’s approach then gives most 
weight to explanation in terms of transaction costs or power strategies, and 
once again it achieves this by considering a single space of calculation, which 
brings it closer to standard economic calculation. On the contrary, the EC 
framework considers a plurality of spaces of calculation and gives the greatest 
importance to the problems of the interpretation and legitimization of rules. 
From this perspective, the EC might help to escape from the reductive reading 
of law proposed by NHI, provided, however, that it integrates in its framework 
an analysis of the dynamics of political power in a very long-term perspective. 
The understanding of the role of central and local governments in the produc-
tion, enforcement, legitimisation and even in the limitation of the rules17 is 
indeed a major key to the explanation of the evolution of a legal institution with 
strong political features like property right. In this light, the work done by the 
EC on the construction of statistical categories by State bodies (Desrosières 
1993) and the analysis of the different conventions d’état existing in contempo-
rary politics (Salais 1998b) have significantly improved our knowledge of State 
and political dynamics in the last 150 years (Vitale 2006). However, much still 
needs to be done to build a larger “politics of conventions on power and author-
ity in a long-time perspective” (Thévenot 2012, 28). Of all the aspects of the 
historical relationship between conventions and property rights, this, in my 
opinion, is the greater challenge to the EC, because it means acquiring the tools 
with which to read the extremely long, dense and complex processes that have 
directed the evolution of governments’ intervention in Western Europe from 
the modern age to the present day.18 This last task is still largely to be carried 
out, and it outlines for the EC a very stimulating research agenda at the inter-
section of history, political science and law. 
  
                                                             
17  See for example the mechanism of public expropriations, with which the State claims the 
right to not protect but to infringe on individual private property (Barbot et al. 2012). 
18  This subject is a classic theme in European historiography in the 1970s (see for instance 
Shennan 1974 and Tilly 1975). However, these publications rarely dealt with the question of 
property rights and their interaction with the dynamics of the formation of national States. 
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